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Article 11

Potential Fall Out From the National
Acid Precipitation Assessment Program
l.

INTRODUCTION

In 1980, Congress, as part of the Acid Precipitation Act of
1980, 1 created the National Acid Precipitation Assessment
Program (NAPAP). The program was designed to identify the
causes and sources of acid rain, to evaluate its environmental,
social, and economic effects and to assess potential methods of
control. 2 As the NAPAP neared its conclusion it was hoped
that the results of the study would shift the focus of the national debate from whether there should be a new acid rain control
program to how that program should be designed. 3
Ten years and $540 million later, the results are in, and
nobody's happy. Environmentalists claim the results underestimate the impact of acid rain on the environment and on the
economy. 4 Industry is upset because Congress has passed new
legislation which seems to ignore the results of the NAPAP.
This paper will examine the possible application of those results to two aspects the of Clean Air Act: International Air
pollution under §115 and National Ambient Air Quality Standards under §108.
II. CONSULTING THE EXPERTS

According to some studies, damage due to acid deposition
is extensive. 5 The World Resources Institute claims that "[e]xtensive death of U.S. forests and $5 billion in annual crop

1.
2.

42 U.S.C. § 8901-8912 (1988).
42 u.s.c. § 8903 (1988).

3.
Larry Blackwood, A Conceptual Framework for an Acid Rain Control Program, 19 ENVTL. L. REP., (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10166 (1989).
4.
Ozone, Acid Rain Causes Extensive Damage to U.S. Crops, Forests, WRI
Says in Report, 20 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 1779 (1990).
5.
Amy Fraenkel, The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution:
Meeting the Challenge of International Cooperation, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 447, 449

(1989) (citing MOLSKI & DMUCHOWSKI, EFFECTS OF ACIDIFICATION OF FORESTS AND
NATURAL VEGETATION, WILD ANIMALS AND INSECTS, ACIDIFICATION AND ITS PoLICY
IMPLICATION 29, (T. Schneider ed. 1986); Cameron, International Cooperation and
Acid Rain Pollution: Establishing the Framework for Control 18 INT'L J. ENVTL
STUD. 129 (1982).
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losses are attributable to acid rain and ozone pollution."6 According to the Institute's report, Air Pollution's Toll on Forests
and Crops, studies such as the NAPAP "underestimated the
impact of air pollution on forests and crops."7 Apparently, an
increase in chronic stress to the forest can result in a complete
ecosystem collapse in which trees lose their resistance to pollution and fail to reproduce. Some claim that this has already happened in Ontario and Tennessee near high emission sources. 8
The concern over acid rain is not limited to North America.
One recent assessment estimates that the damage caused by
acid rain in Europe to forests, lakes, materials, crops and human health ·combined exceeds $13 billion annually. 9
The studies on acid rain are extensive. However, despite
the "more than 3,000 acid rain studies in North America and
Europe, some scientist feel there is not enough evidence to
prove the cause and effect relationship between acid rain and
environmental damage.'>IO Presently, there is sharp disagreement in the scientific community regarding the extent of the
damage being caused by acid rain (if any) and the cost of acid
rain reduction.
For example, with respect to lakes, cause and effect is particularly difficult to prove because acidification of lakes is a
naturally occurring event. 11 According to Edward C. Krug, soil
scientist with Illinois State Water Survey, "highly acidic lakes
[are] common throughout the world, especially in New Zealand
and Australia." 12 While acknowledging that "some lakes in
New York's Adirondack Mountains are acidic," Krug asserts
that this is "due to causes other than acid rain." 13
Krug claims that the Adirondack lakes had historically
been acidic until alkaline soot from massive logging and burning early in this century neutralized the lakes' acidity.

6.
20 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 1779 (1990).
7.
ld.
8.
Timothy Stein, Acid Rain: The Clean Air Act Cannot Handle the Problem,
56 UMKC L. REV. 139, 142 (1987) (citing S. Postel, Air Pollution, Acid Rain,
WORLD WATCH PAPER, N. 58, 28 (1984)).
9.
WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON
FuTURE 180, 181 (1987). See also, MCCORMICK, ACID EARTH: THE GLOBAL THREAT
OF ACID POLLUTION 6 (1985).
Stein, supra note 8, at 143.
10.
ld. at 140 (citing A. Labastille, Acid Rain: How Great the Menace? NATL.
11.
GEOGRAPillC 653, 660, 670-71 (Nov. 1981)).
Conservative Coalition Criticizes Air Bill, 20 ENV'r. REP. (BNA) 2002 (1990).
12.
ld.
13.
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The lakes were then stocked with fish and were seen to be
thriving. But now, he [says], they are returning to their normal, acidic state and acid is leaching into the lakes-but not
from acid rain. Instead he point[s] to highly acidic, peaty
forest floors through which water passes. 14

If Krug is right, the acidification of the lakes in the Adirondack
Mountains cannot be stopped by clean air legislation.
Scientists also disagree about the extent of the damage
acid rain causes to materials such as buildings and statues.
Some scientists claim that "acidic deposition is only one contributor to degradation of construction materials, [and that]
such damage generally can be prevented by maintenance or
other measures." 15 Uncertainty in this area makes cost-benefit
analysis of acid rain prevention difficult at best, unreliable at
worst.
With respect to the cost of acid rain prevention some have
estimated that reducing sulfur dioxide (S02) by fifty-five to
sixty-five percent by the year 2000 from 1980 levels would cost
from $4.6 billion to $6.7 billion per year. 16 However, J.
Laurance Kulp, an environmental consultant and former head
of the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program disagrees. He claims that "acid rain reduction costs in [the Clean
Air Act] could run to $100 billion over the next 10 years." 17
Considering the vast differences among experts, the controversy surrounding the NAPAP should come as no surprise.

A. The NAPAP to the Rescue?
In the spring of 1988, the NAPAP released an interim
report concluding that "little further damage to forests and
waterways would result from acid rain." 18 Within weeks,
Kulp, former head of the NAPAP, resigned. 19 Members of Congress, environmentalists, and the Canadian government accused him of "watering down the report's conclusion and executive summary."2° Kulp had "urged Congress to await the 10-

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

ld.
Acid Rain's Role in Lake, Stream Acidity, 21 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 844 (1990).
See supra note 9.
See 20 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 2002 (1990).
ld.
ld.
ld.
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year NAPAP final study" before passing new clean air legislation.21 Edward Krug, soil scientist with Illinois State Water
Survey, also urged Congress to wait. 22 Congress pushed
through the Clean Air Act before the final study was released.
The new head of the NAPAP, James R. Mahoney, was subjected to similar treatment. Columnist Warren Brookes alleged
that EPA Administrator William K. Reilly had forced Mahoney
to change his congressional testimony on acid rain and that
Mahoney had "cooked the books" on S02 emissions. 23 Brookes
claimed that Mahoney wanted to tell Congress that "the effects
of increased, decreased and constant [acid] deposition are not
statistically significant."24 Instead, Mahoney told Congress
that "emission reductions would benefit aquatic resources and
would mitigate other environmental effects."25 In all, Brookes
claimed that Mahoney made 19 rewrites in his report. 26 In a
letter to Congressman John D. Dingell (D-Mich.), Mahoney denied the allegations. 27 Whether Brookes was right is now academic. In the end, Congress passed a comprehensive acid rain
deposition reduction program and ignored $540 million worth
of research.
Although Congress has ignored the results of its own
study, there may be other uses for the NAPAP.

B.

International Air Pollution and the NAPAP

Much of the acid rain which falls in eastern Canada has its
origin in the United States. Section 115 of the Clean Air Act is
designed to remedy that problem. 28 For section 115 to take effect, however, the EPA Administrator must find, based on scientific studies, that the public welfare of Canada is endangered
by acid rain emitted from the United States. Courts could use
the NAPAP as a basis for evaluating EPA's findings.
In New York v. Thomas 29 environmental groups tried to

21.
ld.
22.
ld.
23.
San Francisco Chronicle Dec. 6 (1989), p. 7/Zl.
24.
ld.
25.
ld.
26.
ld.
27.
NAPAP Head Answers Allegations, 20 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 1646 (1990).
28.
42 U.S.C. § 7415 (1990).
29.
613 F. Supp. 1472 (D.D.C. 1985) rev'd by Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d
1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986) rev'd by Her Majesty The Queen v. The Environmental
Protection Agency, 912 F.2d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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compel the EPA to take action under section 115. However,
they failed in part because the courts were reluctant to compel
the EPA to act while the results of the NAPAP were still pending. Now the results are here and the NAPAP could play a
major role in determining how the Clean Air Act is implemented.

1. The provisions of the Act
Section 115(a) of the Clean Air Act provides that:
[w]henever the Administrator, upon receipt of reports, surveys or studies from any duly constituted international agency has reason to believe that any air pollutant or pollutants
emitted in the United States cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare in a foreign country . . . the Administrator
shall give formal notification thereof to the Governor of the
State in which such emissions originate. 30

The Administrator's finding-that pollution emitted in the
United States contributes to such air pollution-is referred to
as an "endangerment finding." 31
Under section 115(b), the notice to the governor of the
state in which such emissions originate is deemed to be a finding that its State Implementation Plan ("SIP") under the Clean
Air Act is inadequate and must be revised to the extent necessary "to prevent or eliminate the endangerment referred to in
subsection (a)."32 This process is referred to as an "SIP revision."33
The remedy provided by section 115 is applicable "only to a
foreign country which the Administrator determines has given
the United States essentially the same rights with respect to
the prevention or control of air pollution occurring in that country as is given that country by this section."34 This determination is known as a "reciprocity finding''. 35

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

42 U.S.C. §
912 F .2d at
42 u.s.c. §
912 F.2d at
42 U.S.C. §
912 F.2d at

7415(a) (1990).
1528.
7415(b) (1990).
1538.
7415(c) (1990).
1538.
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2. The EPA relies on the experts
In January 1981, shortly before the Reagan Administration
took office, EPA Administrator Douglas M. Costle wrote two
letters, one to Secretary of State Edmund Muskie and one to
Senator George Mitchell. 36 In the letter to Secretary Muskie,
Administrator Costle concluded that "acid deposition is endangering public welfare in the U.S. and Canada and that U.S.
and Canadian sources contribute to the problem not only in the
country where they are located but also in the neighboring
country."37 Administrator Castle's endangerment finding was
based on the Seventh Annual Report on Great Lakes Water
Quality issued by the International Joint Commission (IJC), 38
an organization established by the United States and Canada.
The IJC is a "duly constituted international agency" for purposes of section 115(a). 39 Costle also concluded that there was
reciprocation between the United States and Canada. 40 In his
letter to Senator Mitchell, Costle stated that his conclusions on
endangerment and reciprocity were "adequate to warrant the
initiation of a section 115 based plan revision process in appropriate States" and that he had instructed his staff "to develop
recommendations regarding the States which should receive
formal notification."41 All the elements appeared to be in place
for compelling the EPA to take action.

3. The environmentalists take action
In 1984, several environmental groups, and private citizens
filed suit under section 304(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act. 42 The
groups claimed that Administrator Costle had made endangerment and reciprocity findings in 1981 and that the EPA was
therefore required under section 115 to take action. The EPA
argued, inter alia, that its decision to take action is discretionary because it "requires the fusion of technical knowledge and
skills with judgment which is the hallmark of duties which are

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. 1472, 1486 (D.D.C. 1985).
ld. at 1488.
ld.
912 F.2d at 1529.
613 F. Supp. at 1488.
ld. at 1492.
42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1990).

423] ACID PRECIPITATION ASSESSMENT PROGRAM 429
discretionary."43 The district court granted summary judgment
for the plaintiffs holding that the letters constituted both endangerment and reciprocity findings under section 115 and that
the EPA's decision to take action was nondiscretionary.
However, the court treated the binding effect of the reciprocity finding differently than that of the endangerment finding. The court stated that "a [reciprocity] finding under the
statute must be based on an analysis of facts and law as they
exist at a particular time and that a change of either facts or
law might require reexamination of the determination."44 The
court then allowed the EPA to reassess Administrator Costle's
reciprocity finding to "determine whether Costle's conclusion
remains viable.'>4 5 The court did not, however, allow the EPA
to reassess Costle's endangerment finding but rather ordered
the EPA to "give formal notification to the Governors of the
states in which harmful emissions originate and to set in motion the necessary processes to require a plan revision so as to
prevent or eliminate the endangerment encompassed by the
Castle determinations."46 Although not specifically stated, the
court's reasoning for this distinction seems to rely more on
Costle's letters than on the language of section 115.
In his letter, Costle stated that his reciprocity determination "could be changed should the U.S. conclude that future
Canadian actions interpreting or implementing their legislation
were not giving essentially the same rights to the U.S."47 This
statement by Castle, however, only supports the idea that reciprocity findings should be reassessed. It does not explain why
an endangerment finding is binding on future EPA Administrators. Indeed, it would appear that the language of the statute
requires the opposite result.
To make an endangerment finding the Administrator need
only have "reason to believe that any air pollutant or pollutants
emitted in the United States cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare in a foreign country .... "48 A reciprocity
finding, on the other hand, requires the Administrator to "de-

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

613 F. Supp. at 1485-86.
!d. at 1483.
!d. at. 1484.
!d. at 1486.
!d. at 1483.
42 U.S.C. § 415(a) (1990).
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termine" that reciprocity exists. 49 The court effectively ruled
that the Administrator's determination can be reassessed but
his beliefs are final. To disallow reassessment of the
Administrator's endangerment finding, the basis of which was
no more than a reason to believe, is unreasonable considering
the debate over the effects of acid rain and the fact that the
NAPAP was, at the time of the court's decision, in the middle
of studying the problem. One might suspect that Judge Johnson, who wrote the opinion, had already decided that acid rain
endangered the public welfare of Canada. Regardless of Judge
Johnson's possible bias, her decision would have prevented the
EPA from ever basing an endangerment finding on the NAPAP
report. Costle's endangerment finding was final.
In Thomas v. New York, 50 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia reversed, but for different reasons. Judge
Scalia, writing for the Court of Appeals, held that Administrator Costle's endangerment and reciprocity findings were "rules"
under the Administrative Procedure Act51 (APA) and therefore, could not be promulgated without notice and comment
procedures. 52 Since the Costle findings had not been subjected
to these procedures, they could not serve as the basis for judicial relief. 53 Scalia did not address the issue of whether the
EPA was obliged to promulgate such findings, nor did he address their validity. In fact, Scalia concluded that "[h]ow and
when the agency chooses to proceed to the stage of notification
triggered by the findings is within the agency's discretion and
not subject to judicial compulsion."54 Scalia cited no authority
for this conclusion. It appeared from Scalia's opinion that the
EPA could not be compelled to act absent a showing of an
abuse of discretion. The EPA would be free to look at any
study, including the NAPAP, and ignore or accept Costle's
findings. Although only dicta, this statement seemed to reverse
Judge Johnson's decision to not allow reassessment of Costle's
endangerment finding.
Undaunted, the petitioners next filed petitions for
rulemaking with the EPA under section 553(e) of the APA, 55
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

42 U.S.C. § 415(b) (1990).
802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988).
613 F. Supp. at 1446-48.
ld.
ld. at 1448.
5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1988).
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requesting that the EPA promulgate endangerment and reciprocity findings pursuant to section 115 of the Clean Air
Act. 56 The petitioners asserted that four reports of duly constituted international agencies supported an endangerment
finding, that the reciprocity requirements section 115(c) had
been satisfied, and that Administrator Costle had specifically
made both endangerment and reciprocity findings which had
never been revoked by the EPA. The EPA declined to act on the
petitions.
Eventually, Don R. Clay, Acting Assistant Administrator
for Air and Radiation, responded in writing (insisting however
that he was not speaking for the agency but only for himself).
In his letter, Clay stated: "I do not believe that EPA presently
has a sufficient information base to undertake the regulatory
program required by section 115 . . . . For that reason, . . . I
believe it would be premature to rule on your petition at this
time."57 In Her Majesty the Queen v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 58 petitioners sought review of the Clay
letters as final agency action denying their petitions for
rulemaking. Petitioners asserted that the denial of their petitions for rulemaking was "arbitrary" and "capricious". 59 Petitioners believed that a decision in their favor would force the
agency to act Costle's endangerment findings.

4. The Court's Holding
The holding of Her Majesty is best understood when divided into three parts. First, the court held that the Clay letters
were final agency action regarding EPA's interpretation of the
statute60 and that EPA's interpretation was permissible. 61
Second, the letters were not final agency action regarding
whether EPA had abused its discretion in denying the petitions
for rulemaking given the "complexity of the technical and factual issues that the agency is required to address in this case."62
Third, the EPA did not delay unreasonably in acting on Administrator Costle's findings given "the permissibility of the EPA's

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Her Majesty The Queen v. EPA, 912 F.2d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
ld. at 1530.
ld. at 1525.
Id. at 1530.
ld. at 1531
ld. at 1533-34.
Id. at 1534.
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[interpretation of section 115] . . . and the undisputed technical and scientific uncertainties that must be resolved in order
to trigger section 115."63

5. The EPA's interpretation
Petitioners contended that section 115 is a two step process
and that once step one has occurred (making the endangerment
and reciprocity findings), step two (notifying the Governors of
the respective states) must immediately follow. Petitioners'
interpretation is consistent with the plain language of the statute which states "[w]henever the Administrator [makes endangerment and reciprocity findings] the Administrator shall give
formal notification thereof to the Governor of the State in
which such emissions originate."64 Since four duly constituted
international agencies supported an endangerment finding and
reciprocity still existed, and since Administrator Castle had
already made endangerment and reciprocity findings 65 the
petitioners claimed the EPA was required to publish rules for
notice and comment thereby initiating the remedial process
established by section 115. 66
The EPA interpreted the statute as a unitary or single step
process that required not only endangerment and reciprocity
findings but the EPA's ability to identify the polluting source.
The EPA argued that "the Administrator must have sufficient
evidence correlating the endangerment to sources of pollution
within a particular State before he can exercise his discretion
to make endangerment findings .... "67 In other words, if the
EPA does not know the source of the pollution, the EPA cannot
notify the respective governors as the statute requires. The
court agreed. The court held, inter alia, that:
The statute thus creates a specific linkage between the endangerment finding and the remedial procedures: Once the
endangerment finding is made, the SIP revision process must
follow. As a result, if there is insufficient information to enable the Administrator to implement those remedies, the
promulgation of an endangerment finding alone would largely

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

!d.
42 U.S.C. § 7415(a) (1990).
912 F.2d at 1530.
ld. at 1528.
!d. at 1533.
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be pointless. 68

As construed by the court, section 115(a) should now read:
Whenever the Administrator. . . has reason to believe [that
identifiable sources are contributing] to air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare
in a foreign country, [then notification of the respective Governors is required.] Apparently, Castle's findings were real findings, but their effect (requiring the EPA to notify the respective
Governors) was suspended until the sources of the pollution
could be identified.
However, this leaves unanswered the question of whether
the EPA is permitted to reassess Castle's endangerment finding. The NAPAP was designed to "identify the causes and
sources of acid rain, to evaluate its environmental, social, and
economic effects, and to assess potential methods of control."69
The results of the NAPAP could prove that Castle's endangerment findings were wrong. Nonetheless, the court held that
there is a "specific linkage between the endangerment finding
and the remedial procedures" and once the endangerment finding is made, the SIP revision process "must follow". The court
seemed to be saying that the only ingredient lacking was sufficient "information to enable the Administrator to implement"
section 115. It appeared that ten years and $540 million worth
of research had been rendered useless by two letters from Administrator Castle.
a. The Clay letters were not final agency action regarding
whether EPA abused its discretion in denying the petitions for
rulemaking. Petitioners contended that there was enough evidence to constitute the necessary endangerment and reciprocity
findings, that the findings had already been made by Administrator Castle, and that EPA's denial of their petitions for rule
making constituted final agency action and an abuse of discretion. According to the court, "the agency [had] not made any
final decision on whether endangerment and reciprocity findings [could] be made, nor [had] it conclusively determined
whether it [could] adequately trace pollutants to specific sources in order to issue SIP revision notices." 7° From this statement the court appears to recognize the distinction between

68.
69.
70.

!d.
!d. at 1535; See also 42 U.S.C. § 8903 (1990).
912 F.2d at 1534.
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"making an endangerment finding'' and "identifying specific
sources of pollution" and that the EPA had done neither. However, because the court recognized the EPA's unitary interpretation of the statute, the findings were interdependent and
could not be made separately. True, Castle had already made
endangerment and reciprocity findings, but they were ineffective until the EPA could identify the polluting sources. However, the court did not state whether the EPA could find that no
endangerment was present thereby overruling Castle. The
court only stated that the EPA had not yet made the finding.
b. The EPA did not delay unreasonably in acting on Administrator Costle's findings. The petitioners claimed that the
EPA had "delayed unreasonably" in acting on Castle's findings.
It had been nine years since Castle had made his endangerment finding and the EPA had not acted. 71 The Administrative Procedures Act requires that an agency "proceed to conclude a matter presented to it [within] a reasonable time.'m
Petitioners claimed that nine years of inaction was unreasonable.
The court held that the EPA had not delayed unreasonably
in part because of the pending results of the NAPAP. Mter
noting the "unusual complexity of the factors facing the agency
in determining the effects of acid rain and in tracing the pollutants from the point of deposition back to their sources,"73 the
court stated:
It was for the purpose, among others, of developing a better
understanding of the acid rain phenomenon that Congress enacted the Acid Precipitation Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 89018912 (1982).
[The program] is designed to identify the causes and
sources of acid rain, to evaluate its environmental, social, and
economic effects, and to assess potential methods of control.
See 42 U.S.C. section 8903 .... At oral argument the EPA
pointed to this study as evidence of specific research being
conducted that could enable the agency to take action under
section 115; the EPA also asserted that the report should
provide it with a sufficient basis to make a reasoned decision
on the petitioners' rulemaking petitions.
It is in part on the basis of this information that we con-

71.
72.
73.

!d.
5 U.S.C § 555(b) (1988).
912 F.2d at 1534.
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elude that the EPA's delay in acting on the petitions has been
neither arbitrary, nor capricious, nor contrary to law. 74

This statement has tremendous potential. For example, the
phrase "to evaluate its environmental, social, and economic,
effects" might mean the EPA could use the NAPAP to reassess
Costle's endangerment finding. However, the phrase "could
enable the agency to take action under section 115" implies the
NAPAP will simply enable the EPA to identify the sources of
pollution. It is unclear what the status of the Costle endangerment finding is. Only the judges know for sure.
Congress spent $500 million to identify the causes and
effects of acid rain. The EPA could try to use the NAPAP to
over rule Costle's endangerment finding, courts permitting. Or
it could find the results inconclusive and proceed to act once
the sources of pollution are identified. The decision would seem
to depend on the administrator and who he or she wants to believe: Congress' $500 million study or the environmentalists.

III.

NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY
STANDARDS AND THE NAPAP

Acid rain is caused by 802 and water vapor. 802 is one of
the pollutants for which the EPA is required to establish National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQ8). In establishing those standards, the EPA is to "take into account all the
relevant studies revealed in the record" and "make an informed
judgment based on available evidence."75 The NAPAP is the
most recent study regarding the effects of 802 on the environment and could be used to challenge the NAAQ8 for 802 as
established by the EPA.
To date, the EPA's standards for S02 have yet to be challenged. However, in Natural Resources Defense Counsel v.
EPA, 76 petitioners did challenge EPA's selection of primary
and secondary NAAQ8 for PMlO. Although the pollutant is different, the procedure for challenging the NAAQ8 is the same.
This case provides a useful analogy as to what role the NAPAP
might play in challenging NAAQS for S02.

74.
Id. at 1534-35.
75.
American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982).
76.
902 F.2d 962 (D.C.Cir. 1990).
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The Provisions of the Act

Under section 108 of the Act, the EPA is to identify air
pollutants that are emitted from "numerous or divers" sources
and whose presence in the ambient air "may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.'m The EPA
has identified 802 as one of those pollutants. 78
For each pollutant, the EPA is required to issue a "criteria"
document reflecting its health and welfare effects and a "control techniques" document discussing the costs and benefits of
different types of emission controls. 79 The criteria document,
which serves as the basis for establishing the pollutant levels,
must "accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful
in indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on
public health . . . which may be expected from the presence [of
particulate matter] in the ambient air, in varying quantities.''80 The NAPAP could be regarded as "the latest scientific
knowledge" regarding the effects of 802 and NO, the prime
ingredients in acid rain.
Under section 109, the EPA must issue "primary" and "secondary" NAAQS for each pollutant identified under section
108. 81 The primary standards must protect the public health
while allowing an adequate margin for safety; the secondary
standards must protect the public welfare from any known or
anticipated adverse effects. 82 Under the Clean Air Act, all language which refers to the effects on "public welfare" includes,
but is not limited to "effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation,
manmade material, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and
climate, damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards
to transportation, as well as effects on economic values and on
personal comfort and well-being."83 In setting a standard under section 109, the Administrator must "take into account all
the relevant studies revealed in the record" and "make an informed judgment based on available evidence.''84 The NAPAP

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

42 U.S.C § 7408(a)(1) (1990).
40 C.F.R. 50.4 (1990).
42 U.S.C § 7408(a)(2), (b)(1) (1990).
42 U.S.C § 7408(a)(2) (1990).
42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(2) (1990).
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1990).
42 U.S.C. § 7602(h) (1990).
American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982).
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is such a study.

B.

The EPA Sets the Standard.

In 1986, the Environmental Criteria and Assessment Office
reviewed scientific studies on the health effects of PM10. 85
Based on these studies, the EPA's Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards recommended that the Administrator consider a twenty four hour standard at levels between 140 Jlg/m3
to 250 Jlg/m3 and annual standards at levels between 40 Jlg/m3
to 65 Jlg/m3. 86 On July 1, 1987, after a lengthy notice and
comment period and the issuance of several supplemental proposals, the EPA issued the final rule revising the NAAQS for
particulate matter. 87 The EPA selected 50 Jlg/m3 as the annual standard and 150 Jlg/m3 as the 24-hour primary standards
for PM10. 88
In December 1988, the EPA denied petitions for reconsideration of various aspects of the revised primary and secondary
standards for PM10. 89 In Natural Resources, 90 the petitioners
appealed claiming the Administrator's selection of the twentyfour hour and annual national primary ambient air quality
standards for particulate matter, measured in PM10 was arbitrary and capricious and sought to have them revised. 91

1. The petitioners' argument
The petitioners claimed that the Administrator's selection
of the standards was arbitrary ''because he provided no basis
for distinguishing the health effects associated with the levels
selected from those associated with the levels rejected."92 Petitioners asserted that the "only reliable scientific evidence
shows that standards at the highest levels proposed [250
Jlg/m3] would still protect the public health, including sensitive
subgroups of the population, with an adequate margin of safety."93 Petitioners believed that the levels selected were too
85.
1990).
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Natural Resources Defense Consel v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 968 (D.C. Cir.

!d.
See 52 Fed. Reg. 24,643-45 (1990).
!d. at 24,641-45.
665 F.2d at 967.
902 F.2d 962.
!d. at 967.
!d. at 968.
!d. (quoting Brief amicus curie of the American Iron and Steel Institute at
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low and that the EPA had ignored certain studies. The studies
showed that a standard of 250 pg/m3 rather than 150 pg/m3
would be "well below the levels where a scientific consensus
accepts pollution as responsible for some unknown amount of
life shortening among the elderly and persons with pre-existing
respiratory or cardiac disease. "94

2. The EPA's argument
The EPA acknowledged that the Lawther study indicated
that a PM10 standard of 250 pg/m3 might contain some margin of safety and that the London Mortality study indicated
that 250 pg/m3 would be "well below" the pollution levels that
produced "excess mortality" in London. However, the EPA concluded that because other studies indicated adverse health
effects below 250 pg/m3, and because of differences between
the United States and London in particulate composition, and
because of difficulties in converting from British Smoke (the
indicator for particulate matter used in the London and
Lawther studies) to PM10 measurements, those studies could
not be relied upon exclusively. 95
In issuing the final rule which established the NAAQS, the
Administrator concluded that a twenty-four hour PM10 standard greater than 150 pg/m3 would "present an unacceptable
risk of premature mortality" and allow the possibility of significant I ung function changes. 96

3. The standard of review
The court stated that in reviewing the agency's determination it "must carefully review the record to ascertain that the
agency has made a reasoned decision based on 'reasonable
extrapolations from some reliable evidence."'97 This standard
goes farther than simply requiring the Administrator to "consider" or "take into account" all of the available studies. The
20, Natural Resources 902 F.2d at 968).
94.
ld. at 969 (citing Lawther, Waller & Henderson, Air Pollution and Exacerbations of Bronchitis, 25 THORAX 525 (1970); Martin & Bradly, Mortality, Fog and
Atmospheric Pollution-An Investigation During the Winter of 1958-59, 19 MONTHLY
BULL. MINISTRY HEALTH LAB. SERV. 56 (1960); Martin, Mortality and Morbidity
Statistics and Air Pollution, 57 PROC. ROYAL Soc'y MED. 969 (1964)).
95.
See 52 Fed. Reg. at 24,643 (1990).
96.
ld.
97.
902 F.2d at 968 (quoting National Resources Defense Council v. Thomas,
805 F.2d 410, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
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standard requires that the decision be a "reasoned" one based
on "reasonable extrapolations". This requires a substantive
rather than procedural review of the Administrator's decision.
Although not articulated by the court, the reason for this high
level of scrutiny is probably because the criteria document,
which serves as th::J basis for establishing the pollutant levels,
must "accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful
in indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on
public health ... which may be expected from the presence [of
particulate matter] in the ambient air, in varying quantities."98 The reviewing judge, therefore, must determine the
accuracy of the Administrators decision. This constitutes a
higher standard of review when compared to the abuse of discretion standard employed by the court in Her Majesty the
Queen. 99

4.

The court's holding

The court held that the EPA's selection of the twenty-four
hour standard was reasonable in light of the conflicting studies
and the agency's mandate to provide an adequate margin of
safety. 100 However, as required by the standard of review, the
court did not leave EPA free to arbitrarily choose the various
levels.
While noting that the decision of the Administrator "did
not spring from a bounty of definitive research," 101 the court
held that such is not required. The court stated, that "[t]he
Administrator is required to provide an adequate margin of
safety. And '[i]n setting margins of safety the Administrator
need not regulate only the known dangers to health, but may
'err' on the side of overprotection by setting a fully adequate
margin of safety."' 102 This statement implies that regulating
unknown dangers in the name of overprotection is required for
the margin of safety to be fully adequate. This also seems to
contradict the standard of review employed by the court. Under
that standard, the Administrator's decision must be based on

98.
42 U.S.C § 7408(a)(2) (1990).
99.
912 F.2d 1525.
100.
902 F.2d at 969.
101.
902 F.2d at 972.
102.
!d. at 968 (quoting American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1186, 1186
(D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1034, (1982)).
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"reasonable extrapolations from some reliable evidence", 103
and that evidence is contained in the criteria document which
must "accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge". 104
There seems little room for regulating unknown dangers. Nonetheless, the court grants the EPA the power.
The NAPAP might be used by industry to challenge
NAAQS for 802. However, the success of the challenge will
probably rely not on the standard of review or on the statutory
requirements but on whether the judge believes that regulating
unknown dangers in the name of overprotection is required to
provide a fully adequate margin of safety. The political predilections of judges and of the EPA are much more crucial than
the results of scientific studies.
IV.

CLEAN AIR ACT TO THE RESCUE?

In 1990, Congress passed legislation amending the Clean
Air Act. The amendments leave in place the provisions concerning International Air Pollution and National Ambient Air
Quality Standards discussed above. However, as part of that
legislation, Congress enacted the Acid Deposition Control program (ADC). 105 The ADC is much more specific in its instruction to the EPA regarding the control of acid rain through the
reduction of 802 emissions. In fact, the EPA is given no discretion regarding the dangers of acid rain.
Despite the controversy over the effects of acid rain, the
Congress found that "the presence of acidic compounds and
their precursors in the atmosphere and in deposition from the
atmosphere represents a threat to natural resources, ecosystems, materials, visibility, and public health." 106 How Congress made this finding is not stated in the amendments to the
Clean Air Act, and it would appear that this finding directly
contradicts the results of the NAPAP. Congress should have
said it "declares" rather that it "finds".
Why Congress chose to ignore the results of the NAPAP in
amending the Clean Air Act is not clear. It could be that Congress does not trust the EPA to protect the environment. It
could be that Congress does not trust the courts to protect the
environment. It could be that reducing acid rain and 802 emis103.
104.
105.
106.

902 F.2d at 968.

!d.
The Clean Air Act Title IV.

!d. at § 401.
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sions is just the politically expedient thing to do. It could be
that environmental groups have a very powerful lobby and
enough money to purchase the necessary influence to get their
agenda through Congress. Or it could be all of the above. Whatever the reasons, the controversy continues despite the $500
million NAPAP study.
According to Gene E. Likens, Director of the Institute of
Ecosystems Studies in Millbrook, New York, "it appears that
the acid rain remedy adopted by Congress . . . is too little too
late." 107 Mr. Likens' "findings" indicate that "the reductions in
emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides mandated by
the 1990 amendments are far less than what would be required
to protect sensitive ecosystems from continuing damage from
acidic rain, snow, fog and dust." 108 Likens claims that the
new protections are inadequate because "[t]hey were not scientifically based; they were chosen on political and economic
grounds." 109
Of course, not everyone agrees with Mr. Likens. "A
spokesperson for the Edison Electric Institute, an association of
the electric utilities that must bear the brunt of emissions
control requirements, said that 'nothing in the NAPAP report
supports [Likens's analysis]."' 110 The spokesperson asked not
to be identified. James Mahoney, the former director of
NAPAP, added, "I don't hear [Likens's] scientific colleagues arguing that the reductions were not enough." 111
The usefulness of the NAPAP study is now unclear. Although it might be used to challenge endangerment findings
under section 115 of the Clean Air Act, or to challenge NAAQS
as promulgated by the EPA under section 108, the courts might
be prompted to ignore it; after all, Congress ignored it in passing the Clean Air Act. Yet Congress hasn't lost all confidence in
the NAPAP. Congress recently assigned the NAPAP to monitor
the effectiveness of the new Clean Air Act controls. 112 If the
NAPAP has been unable to identify the causes and effects of
acid rain, its ability to monitor the effectiveness of the new acid

107.
Philip Shabecoff, Acid Rain: Are the Remedies Adequate to the Problem,
American Political Network, Inc. Greenwire, Dec. 16, 1991.
!d.
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rain controls is doubtful. Maybe Congress should create a program to monitor the effectiveness of the NAPAP. They could
call it the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program.

Steve Russell

